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Digital Originality 
Edward Lee* 
[The creative act] is an act of liberation—the defeat of habit by originality.1 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the doctrine of originality in U.S. 
copyright law and proposes a reconfigured, three-part test that can 
better analyze issues of first impression involving works created with 
new digital technologies. The proposed test, encapsulated by the 
concept of digital originality, provides much needed guidance to courts 
to address the increasing complexities of digital creations in the 
twenty-first century. 
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Originality is the most fundamental requirement of U.S. 
copyright law.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Copyright 
Clause requires originality as a basic prerequisite to the grant of 
copyright for every work, meaning: (1) the work must be 
independently created with (2) a modicum of creativity.2  However, the 
precise contours of these requirements remain obscure.  Like 
obscenity, originality is a doctrine perhaps best described by the 
(non)principle of “I know it when I see it,”3 meaning judges are left 
considerable discretion to decide the issue.  Fortunately, in the more 
than twenty years following Feist, the lack of clarity in the doctrine of 
originality has not posed a serious problem.  Because the threshold for 
originality is so low, most works easily pass the test, thereby obviating 
the need for courts to explain the doctrine in depth.4 
This happy doctrinal détente is now under siege.  Increasingly, 
creations from new digital technologies raise confounding questions of 
originality, making problematic the notions of both “independent 
 
 2.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 3.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 4.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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creation” and a “modicum of creativity.”5  Put simply, copyright law’s 
traditional notions of authorship are strained when machines do 
much, if not all, of the creating.6  For example, three-dimensional (3D) 
printers can make virtually any object, such as a sculpture, in three 
dimensions.7  A human must create (though in some cases can just 
copy) the design of the object, but the printer does the rest.  As Chris 
Anderson of Wired put it, “If you can draw it, we can make it.”8  Are 
the 3D objects created by these printers original expression?  If so, 
who owns the copyright—the printer manufacturer, the user, or 
someone else?  Consider also the popular iPhone 4S, with its 
artificially intelligent personal assistant named Siri, who answers, 
both by text and by voice, any question an iPhone user asks.9  Are 
Siri’s conversations copyrightable?  If so, who owns the  
copyright—Apple, the user, or perhaps Siri itself?  Ask Siri and it is 
resigned to answer: “I don’t understand.”10 
Courts have yet to grapple with these perplexing questions.  
Yet one court of appeals’s decision, Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor 
Sales U.S.A., Inc.,11 presages the difficulty of these questions.  In 
Meshwerks, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled 
controversially that a wire-frame digital model of a Toyota car, created 
by humans with the aid of computers, lacked originality, despite the 
human expertise and skill needed to create the model in a realistic 
manner and with a 3D appearance.12  If courts apply the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach to other digital creations, such as works from 3D 
printers, copyright law may deny protection to many digital works for 
lack of originality.  Although this result might be defensible, the 
reasoning must be more carefully thought out before courts begin to 
deny copyrights to a whole class of works. 
This Article begins that undertaking.  Part I examines the 
doctrine of originality and the challenges posed by digital technologies.  
It dissects the Meshwerks case and its confused reasoning.  Part II 
proposes a more fully articulated test of originality—under the 
 
 5.  See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See Print Me a Stradivarius: How a New Manufacturing Technology Will Change 
the World, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18114327; Roger Yu, More 
Design Hobbyists, Entrepreneurs Use 3D Printing, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www. 
usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-02-20/3D-printing/53179186/1. 
 8.  See FORA.tv, 3D Printing: If You Can Draw It, You Can Make It, YOUTUBE (June 
23, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XeLtaqF4ws. 
 9.  See iPhone 4S—Ask Siri to help you get things done, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ 
iphone/features/siri.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 10.  Siri, Are Your Answers Copyrightable?, SIRI FOR IPHONE 4S (on file with author). 
 11.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 12.  Id. at 1266. 
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doctrine of “digital originality”—to deal with the controversies raised 
by digital technologies in cases involving novel or difficult issues of 
law regarding originality.  The proposed test reconfigures the test of 
originality from a two-part to a three-part test, and then more fully 
delineates each part.  Part II also discusses studies related to the 
artistic process that add greater insight to understanding originality, 
especially regarding realistic depictions of objects in the world.  To 
demonstrate how the revised test operates, Part II applies it to the 
digital models in Meshwerks, 3D printed objects, and Siri’s answers.  
Under the proposed test, Meshwerks would come out differently—the 
digital models of the Toyota car should satisfy originality.  Part III 
addresses concerns. 
I. ORIGINALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
This Part explains the doctrine of originality and examines how 
digital technologies raise difficult issues for the doctrine—presenting 
more substantial challenges than experienced in the past.  As digital 
creations become more automated and the process of creation and 
relationships among actors become more fluid, notions of originality 
will become more strained. 
A. Originality 
Originality is the most important requirement for obtaining a 
copyright.  Although the basic contours of the doctrine are 
straightforward, some commentators have recently expressed 
dissatisfaction with the doctrine.13  Before delving into the 
complexities that digital creations pose, the following section provides 
a brief refresher on the basics of the doctrine. 
1. Feist Test 
In 1991, in the landmark Feist decision, the Supreme Court 
clarified the doctrine of originality and its status as a constitutional 
requirement of the Copyright Clause.14  To some copyright 
commentators, the Court’s constitutional ruling was a surprise.15  But 
 
 13.  See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
 14.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-48 (1991). 
 15.  See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1 (3d 
ed. Supp. 2012) (casting doubt on the precedential support for orginality’s status as a 
constitutional requirement). 
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other commentators shared the view adopted by the Feist Court.16  
Indeed, the Court drew from, of all places, Nimmer on Copyright to 
articulate the following constitutional test of originality: “Original, as 
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”17 
Since the decision, over 550 lower court decisions have 
discussed or applied the Feist test of originality.18  Yet most 
copyrighted works have no difficulty satisfying the low threshold of 
originality.  As the Feist Court stated, “[t]he vast majority of works 
make the grade quite easily.”19  Even in the few areas that have 
presented more litigated issues of originality, such as compilations, 
derivative works, maps, and photographs, courts have not had much 
difficulty applying the test of originality.20 
 
 
 
 
 16.  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 
763 n.155 (1989)). 
 17.  Id. at 345 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.01(A)-(B) (1990)). Of course, the Supreme Court can articulate a constitutional principle 
based on any source it fancies, but one might expect the Court to rely directly on its own 
precedents for constitutional law rather than on secondary sources such as a treatise. 
 18.  Feist /p Originality, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (follow “Search” hyperlink 
and select “Terms & Connectors” hyperlink; then select “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” and “U.S. 
District Court Cases” hyperlinks; then enter “Feist /p originality” in the “Search” hyperlink) (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 19.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 20.  See, e.g., Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 
417, 430 (4th Cir. 2010) (“For compilations of preexisting elements, ‘the principal focus should be 
on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit 
protection.’” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 358)); Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“Additions to the preexisting maps such as color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and 
shapes fall within the narrow category of works that lack even a minimum level of 
creativity . . . .”); see also Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing a liberal standard of originality for photographs based on staging or rendition of the 
scene, “except perhaps for a very limited class of photographs that can be characterized as 
‘slavish copies’ of an underlying work”). Schrock also held that “(1) the originality requirement 
for derivative works is not more demanding than the originality requirement for other works; 
and (2) the key inquiry is whether there is sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the 
derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying work in some meaningful way.” 
Schrock, 586 F.3d at 521. 
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2. Recent Debate among Scholars 
The relative lack of controversy over the doctrine of originality 
in cases has not stopped academics from raising several controversies 
of their own.  Some scholars believe that originality is too permissive 
or indiscriminate in allowing works to qualify for copyright.21  For 
example, Professor Joseph Miller argues that originality should 
incorporate something akin to a nonobviousness requirement from 
patent law, thereby imposing a much higher standard for works to 
qualify for copyright.22  Miller proposes this new standard to decrease 
the number of works eligible for copyright and thereby reduce the 
extent to which copyright permeates people’s daily lives.23  Likewise, 
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein contend that 
copyright law should be changed to give greater or lesser protection 
depending on whether the work has more or less originality.24  In their 
view, which curiously lacks any empirical or anecdotal support, “the 
current approach incentivizes production of too many works at the low 
end of the originality spectrum and a suboptimal number of truly 
original works.”25  Other scholars share Parchomovsky and Stein’s 
criticisms of originality under current doctrine.26 
By contrast, Professor Eva Subotnik suggests that the current 
low threshold of originality is probably the best courts can do in 
delineating the doctrine because “courts are ultimately doomed to fail 
in the quest to explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship 
is original in and of itself.”27  According to Subotnik, “Caught between 
the impermissibility of relying upon aesthetic virtues, on the one 
hand, and the degree of effort expended by an author, on the other, the 
closest courts can come to identifying originality, at least under the 
current copyright framework, is through proxies for the legal 
concept.”28 
Although illuminating, the recent debate among scholars over 
originality has yet to confront the more pressing problem the doctrine 
 
 21.  See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 457-63 
(2009).  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1507 
(2009). 
 25.  Id. at 1506. 
 26.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of 
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 67 (2009) (“Parchomovsky and Stein are indeed 
correct to lament the meaninglessness of originality under current copyright doctrine.”). 
 27.  Eva E. Subotnik, Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
1487, 1494 (2011). 
 28.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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faces: its application to digital creations.  Digital creations will 
increasingly test copyright’s understanding of originality in ways not 
encountered before. 
B. Digital Creations 
The Meshwerks case, decided in 2008, previewed the challenges 
that digital creations present.29  As the Section below explains, the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis is questionable on several fronts.30 
1. Meshwerks 
Meshwerks is a “3D Digital Content Creation Studio using 
state of the art technology to provide highly creative 3[D] solutions for 
film, commercial, broadcast television and game companies.”31  In 
2003, Toyota hired Meshwerks to help create digital models of Toyota 
cars for use by an ad agency working for Toyota.32  The digital models 
provided better substitutes for photographs because users can adjust 
the models—such as in color, background, styling—by computer, 
thereby replacing the need to retake photos for such changes in the 
future.33 
Meshwerks was responsible for creating 3D digital wire frames 
of the Toyota cars; the wire frames look like a skeletal or lattice 
framework depicting the cars.34  One of Meshwerks’s wire-frame 
models (submitted to the court) is reproduced below in Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29.  See generally Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 
(10th Cir. 2008). 
 30.  Meshwerks has generated considerable criticism already. See, e.g., Andrew C. 
Landsman, Comment, Fender Bender: 3D Computer Modeling of Commercial Objects and the 
Meshwerks v. Toyota Decision, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 429, 430 (2009); Michael 
Palumbo, Note, Copyright Protection for the Fruits of Digital Labor: Finding Originality in 
Digital Wire-Frames, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (2009); see also Dennis S. Karjala, 
Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 184-85 (2008) (arguing that the better 
approach would have been to allow copyright, but “the scope of protection should be narrowed to 
the point that only slavish copying—through the modern equivalents of photocopying, like the 
use of molds for three-dimensional works—is held to infringe”). 
 31.  About Us, MESHWERKS, http://www.meshwerks.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink) 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 32.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. 
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 Figure 1.  Meshwerks’s wire-frame depiction35 
 
The user or viewer could presumably rotate the wire-frame 
model of the car to different angles on the computer.36 
Meshwerks’s process for creating the wire frames involved 
three steps.  First, in the measurement stage, “Meshwerks took 
copious measurements of Toyota’s vehicles by covering each car, truck, 
and van with a grid of tape and running an articulated arm tethered 
to a computer over the vehicle to measure all points of intersection in 
the grid.”37  Second, in the mapping stage, “the vehicles’ data points 
(measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the 
modeling software connected the dots to create a ‘wire frame’ of each 
vehicle.”38  Third, in the sculpting stage, Meshwerks employees had to 
fine-tune or “sculpt” the wire-frame models manually on the computer 
because the computer-generated model of the car after the second 
stage was relatively crude.39 
In the sculpting phase, the amount of human input by 
Meshwerks’s employees in creating the digital model of the car was 
extensive: 
Approximately 90 percent of the data points contained in each final model, Meshwerks 
represents, were the result . . . of the skill and effort its digital sculptors manually 
expended at the [sculpting] step.  For example, some areas of detail, such as wheels, 
headlights, door handles, and the Toyota emblem, could not be accurately measured 
using current technology; those features had to be added at the . . . “sculpting” stage, 
and Meshwerks had to recreate those features as realistically as possible by hand, based 
on photographs.  Even for areas that were measured, Meshwerks faced the challenge of 
converting measurements taken of a three-dimensional car into a two-dimensional 
computer representation; to achieve this, its modelers had to sculpt, or move, data points 
to achieve a visually convincing result.  The purpose and product of these processes, 
after nearly 80 to 100 hours of effort per vehicle, were two-dimensional wire-frame 
 
 35.  Id. at 1271 app. A. 
 36.  Id. at 1265 (stating that the wire-frame car lacked a choice on “the angle at which to 
pose it”). 
 37.  Id. at 1260. 
 38.  Id. The court grouped the mapping and measurement stages together. See id. For 
clarity, this Article distinguishes the two. 
 39.  Id. at 1261. 
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depictions of Toyota’s vehicles that appeared three-dimensional on screen, but were 
utterly unadorned—lacking color, shading, and other details.40 
The legal dispute in Meshwerks arose over the terms of the 
license for the Meshwerks wire-frame model.41  According to 
Meshwerks, the license allowed Toyota only a single commercial use of 
the wire-frame model, but Toyota used the model in subsequent 
advertisements.42  After registering with the Copyright Office the 
copyright for its wire-frame model of the Toyota car, Meshwerks sued 
Toyota and Toyota’s ad agency for copyright infringement.43  As a 
defense, Toyota argued that Meshwerks’s wire-frame models “lacked 
sufficient originality to be protected by copyright” because “any 
original expression found in Meshwerks’ products was attributable to 
the Toyota designers who conceived of the vehicle designs.”44 
The trial court agreed with Toyota and held “that the 
wire-frame models were merely copies of Toyota’s products, not 
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.”45  On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that “Meshwerks’ models are not 
so much independent creations as (very good) copies of Toyota’s 
vehicles.”46  Therefore, viewed as merely copies, Meshwerks’s wire 
frames flunked the test of originality.47 
The appellate court’s decision is not a model of clarity.  At the 
outset, the court noted its difficulty with the issue presented: “how 
might that doctrine apply in an age of virtual worlds and digital media 
that seek to mimic the ‘real’ world, but often do so in ways that 
undoubtedly qualify as (highly) original?”48  Although the court 
identified the right question, its opinion ambled between (1) 
originality cases involving photographs49 and (2) originality cases 
involving factual compilations.50  The court’s conflation of these cases 
is apparent in the court’s string citation of cases that the court 
believed stood for the principle that copyright does not extend to 
“copies of facts in the world, as well as copies of prior works of art.”51  
This error infected the court’s holding: “[W]e hold . . . that, standing 
 
 40.  Id. at 1260-61 (emphasis added). 
 41.  Id. at 1261. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 1264. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1263. 
 49.  See id. at 1263-66. 
 50.  See id. at 1264-65. 
 51.  Id. at 1267. 
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alone, ‘[t]he fact that a work in one medium has been copied from a 
work in another medium does not render it any the less a ‘copy.’”52 
Lost in the sea of the court’s string citation is the fact that the 
Toyota car is not a work of expression.  It is a car—an uncopyrightable 
useful article.53  That key factual distinction renders irrelevant nearly 
all of the cases and authorities cited by the Tenth Circuit to support 
its holding.54  The Feist Court explicitly stated that “independently 
create[]” meant not “copied from other works.”55  In Meshwerks, the 
Toyota cars are not works of expression—they are useful articles, 
devices whose designs are inseparable from the functions they serve.  
Therefore, depicting those useful objects in one’s own drawing or 
representation is not “copying” in the Feist sense.  Most courts that 
have addressed the issue recognize originality in realistic depictions of 
uncopyrightable things in the world,56 although two district courts 
 
 52.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8.01(B) (2009)). 
 53.  A useful article is not copyrightable unless it has a design that “incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable 
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) 
(defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). Applying this test, the Toyota car design 
would most likely fail. Under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s “design process” 
test, the court examines what the designer in fact did. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. 
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1987). If the designer was “significantly influenced 
by functional considerations” in choosing the design elements, those elements will not be 
separable or copyrightable. Id. It is hard to imagine that Toyota’s designers were not 
significantly influenced by functional considerations in designing the car at issue. The Toyota car 
looks like a basic sedan, without any artistic embellishments. Under the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit’s approach, a court may also consider whether “the design creates in the 
mind of an ordinary observer two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained 
simultaneously.” Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., 
dissenting)). Under this test, the Toyota car likely fails as well—the features of the Toyota car 
are arguably impossible to separate from their function to make the car run and perform well as 
a vehicle. When one looks at the Toyota car, it appears as nothing more than a vehicle for 
transportation. But cf. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 
1235, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1991) (some design features of Ferrari cars were not functional under 
trademark law and chosen for their distinctiveness and beauty, not utility). 
 54.  The cases involving copying other works relied on by the Tenth Circuit are 
inapposite. See ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 
F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (no originality in sketches of transmissions parts “copied from 
photographs cut out of competitors’ catalogs”) (emphasis added); Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. 
Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (copying characters for 3D 
costumes); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (copying Disney 
characters in plastic); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (no originality in slavish photographic copies of public domain paintings lacking 
any distinguishable variation). 
 55.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
 56.  See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding originality in some 
features of realistic sculpture of a jellyfish); Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 
1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding originality in realistic depiction of animal in stuffed toy 
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have had some confusion in the case law regarding photographs.57  Put 
simply, realism is not contrary to originality. 
Besides Meshwerks, no published decision has ever held that a 
person’s own realistic sketch or rendering of an uncopyrightable thing 
is a mere “copy” of the object that fails the “independently create” 
requirement of Feist.58  The only arguably relevant case authority the 
Tenth Circuit cited involved a simple site map that used stock 
features, which the case found lacked originality.59  There was no 
suggestion in Meshwerks that the digital models of the car were 
simple stock features. 
Ultimately, the court’s holding that Meshwerks’s digital models 
were mere copies cannot withstand scrutiny.  If the court’s analysis 
were correct, then every realistic pencil sketch of objects in the world, 
such as the kind Leonardo da Vinci was famous for,60 could never 
 
animal); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(finding originality in realistic photographs of cakes); Cannon Grp., Inc. v. Better Bags, Inc., 250 
F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding originality in realistic drawing of ears of corn); E. 
Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding 
originality in photographs of electrical products); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. 
Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding originality in stuffed toy lambs and 
bunnies); R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(finding originality in stuffed toy fish, frogs, and monkeys). 
 57.  See Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 542, 
549 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (finding no originality in photographs of motorcycle taillights where the 
“photographs were meant to serve the purely utilitarian purpose of displaying examples of its 
product to potential consumers, and do not merit copyright protection”); Oriental Art Printing, 
Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding no originality 
in photographs of Chinese food dishes to sell the food to customers). In determining originality, 
these cases appear to place great weight on the purpose of the photographs to sell the items they 
depict. The Feist test, however, does not hinge on the commercial or advertising purpose of a 
work. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that “[t]he purpose of the photographs . . . is irrelevant” for originality purposes). 
 58.  In an unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did find 
a drawing of a spindle bearing failed originality for lack of creativity, because it was a realistic 
depiction that was common in mail-order catalogs in the industry. See J. Thomas Distribs., Inc. 
v. Greenline Distribs., Inc., No. 95-2100, 1996 WL 636138, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1996). This 
decision seems to be wrongly decided, although this author has not reviewed the drawing itself. 
The proper analysis probably would recognize a thin copyright in the drawing of a spindle that 
would allow others to draw a spindle as well. Also, some elements of different objects may be 
uncopyrightable if they are stock elements that must be included in standard depictions of the 
objects. Courts have dealt with this issue under the idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire 
doctrine. See, e.g., Satava, 323 F.3d at 810-12. These doctrines are different from originality and 
when applied, often result in a “thin” copyright granted to depictions of such objects with stock 
elements as long as there is some minimal level of creativity. Id. Such a ruling is much different 
from Meshwerks, which denied copyright to the digital model of the car altogether. Meshwerks, 
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 59.  Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(finding site plan using standard cartographic features lacked originality in the selection, 
coordination, and arrangement of facts). 
 60.  See Albert M. Rosenblatt, The Interaction of Law and Psychiatry: A Voyage Over the 
Ages, 69 ALB. L. REV. 969, 979 (2006) (“Leonardo da Vinci could study the bodies of both the 
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qualify for a copyright because they would be “mere copies of facts.”  
That reasoning is contrary to Feist, which dealt with compilations of 
facts (i.e., names and phone numbers) embodied in simple text, not a 
person’s visual representation of uncopyrightable objects in the 
world.61  To consider the two to be one and the same is erroneous.  
Raw facts are not copyrightable, whereas depictions of the world are.62 
Also dubious is the Tenth Circuit’s elevation and application of 
photography cases to define the litmus test for originality in digital 
models.63  Based on this analogy, the court reduced the possibilities of 
satisfying originality for digital models to cases where the creator 
made “decisions regarding lighting, shading, the background in front 
of which a vehicle would be posed, the angle at which to pose it, or the 
like.”64  Those are some of the typical bases in which courts deem 
photographs of objects to be original.65  Under prevailing doctrine, 
virtually all photographs pass the test because a photograph always 
captures some personality of the taker.66  Curiously, though, in the 
case of Meshwerks’s wire-frame models, the court held that they 
depicted only “unadorned vehicles” absent “lighting, angle, 
perspective, and ‘other ingredients’ associated with an original 
expression.”67 
There are two major flaws with the court’s analysis.  First, the 
court provided no justification for equating digital modeling entirely 
with photography.68  Although the two may share some similarity in 
the end products produced—a digital model may yield something akin 
to a photograph that a user can manipulate—the processes involved in 
photography and digital modeling are vastly different.  As explained 
 
living and the dead and draw anatomical sketches so accurate that they were used by physicians 
for centuries.”); Boyce Rensberger, The Art of Science; Eyes of Illustrators Help Scientists to See, 
WASH. POST, July 10, 1996, at H1 (describing creativity involved in “rendering 
three-dimensionality on a two-dimensional surface” in scientific illustrations). 
 61.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991). 
 62.  See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 112-15 and 
accompanying text. The following example illustrates this basic distinction: A listing of a 
person’s name and address is an uncopyrightable fact, but a visual depiction of that person’s 
house and residence would be potentially copyrightable. The former is a bare, textual description 
of a fact, while the latter is a person’s particular visual interpretation and rendition of a fact. 
 63.  See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Cf. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing possible originality in photographs by rendition, timing, and choice of subject 
matter). 
 66.  See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. (Skyy I), 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2000); Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(“[N]o photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the 
author . . . .”). 
 67.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266. 
 68.  See generally id. 
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above, digital modeling of wire frames involves extensive measuring, 
computer modeling, and then human sculpting of data points that may 
require considerable human input, skill, and judgment to render an 
image that is realistic enough to appear three dimensional, even 
though represented in two dimensions.69  As artists have confirmed, 
this artistic effect—depicting the two dimensional to appear three 
dimensional—requires considerable creativity and human thought.70  
Taking photographs involves none of these steps or human choices, 
however.  A camera’s representation of an object is far more 
mechanical in this respect.  One can merely point and shoot. 
By comparison, the critical “sculpting” stage involved in 
Meshwerks’s models is more akin to drawing or sculpting a figure 
than photographing it.71  Just as in drawing or sculpting (but not in 
photography), Meshwerks’s digital modeling depended primarily on 
human skill and conception, not mechanical reproduction, to render a 
realistic expression of the object.72 
Second, even if the court uses photography cases as the test of 
originality for digital models, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is 
unconvincing.  As noted earlier, the prevailing approach is that 
virtually any photograph—even from an automatic, point-and-shoot 
camera—satisfies the originality requirement, on the theory that 
every photograph captures some aspect of the personality of the 
person taking the photograph.73  The sole case cited by Meshwerks in 
which the court found certain photographs lacked originality involved 
photographs of other works, not uncopyrightable objects.74 
Also dubious is the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that Meshwerks 
made no decision regarding lighting, shading, the background, or 
angle at which the wire-frame car was posed.75  Drawing a skeletal, 
3D wire-frame representation of a car that can be rotated to different 
angles, represents a choice regarding at least shading, background, 
 
 69.  Id. at 1267-68. 
 70.  See Gregory P. Garvey, Life Drawing and 3D Figure Modeling with MAYA: 
Developing Alternatives to Photo-Realistic Modeling, 35 LEONARDO 303, 304-05 (2002) (“Creating 
convincing characters with believable movement requires much more than anatomical 
correctness. . . . A mastery of drawing and understanding of anatomy and proportion lay the 
groundwork for making believable corrections, enhancements or distortions to polygonal meshes 
created from 3D scanning.”). 
 71.  See id. at 306 (making connection between traditional drawing and 3D modeling for 
art workshop); Landsman, supra note 30, at 443; Palumbo, supra note 30, at 151. 
 72.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260-61. 
 73.  See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 74.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1267 (citing Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 
F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Wisely, the Tenth Circuit did not rely on two decisions of 
suspect reasoning that focused on the advertising purpose of the photographs in finding no 
originality. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 75.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265. 
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and angle.76  The shading is a single color (such as grayscale), akin to 
a pencil sketch.77  The creator uses lines for the wire frames with 
see-through spaces in between.78  Likewise, the absence of a defined 
background represents a choice about the background, much in the 
same way photographers choose to have completely white or black 
backgrounds for artistic effect.79  Moreover, the choice to allow the 
wire-frame car to be turned to numerous angles represents a choice 
about the various angles in which the car can be viewed and still 
retain its apparent 3D appearance.80  None of these options—gray 
lines, a blank background, or a changeable pose—is mandated by all 
computer-aided design (CAD) software for every 3D representation.81  
Just as a sketch artist can choose to go beyond a gray pencil color and 
blank background, so too a digital artist can choose to go beyond a 
gray wire frame, blank background, and changeable pose.  That either 
artist sticks with those aforementioned features in her rendition does 
not somehow disqualify her selection from being a choice of how to 
create the rendition. 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis incorrectly based its 
analysis of “independently create” on “(1) an objective assessment of 
the particular models . . . and (2) the parties’ purpose in creating 
 
 76.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text; infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See, e.g., Set Color, Screening, Grayscale, and Dither in Plot Style Tables, AUTOCAD, 
http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.h
tml?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce210c4a30acaf-5f36.htm,topicNumber=d0e142240 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing choice of colors on AutoCAD software, including grayscale). This 
author has used the options available on AutoCAD, a popular computer-aided design (CAD) 
software, for illustrative purposes. Although Meshwerks used different types of CAD software, it 
is reasonable to assume the CAD software had comparable, if not even more sophisticated, 
options. See infra note 81. 
 78.  See, e.g., Create Wireframe Models, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/ 
ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce
210c4a30acaf-67c8.htm,topicNumber=d0e100543 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing option 
of creating wireframe models as one option in addition to using solids, meshes, and objects with 
thickness). 
 79.  See, e.g., Display Backgrounds and Shadows, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/ 
ACD/2010/ENU/AutoCAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a919382645
5f5ffa23ce210c4a30acaf-67c8.htm,topicNumber=d0e100543 (follow “Control the Drawing Views” 
hyperlink; then follow “Change Views” hyperlink; then follow “Shade a Model and Use Edge 
Effects” hyperlink; then follow “Customize a Visual Style” hyperlink; then follow “Display 
Backgrounds and Shadows” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (discussing option of adding 
backgrounds and shadows).  
 80.  See, e.g., Rotate Objects, AUTOCAD, http://docs.autodesk.com/ACD/2010/ENU/Auto 
CAD%202010%20User%20Documentation/index.html?url=WS1a9193826455f5ffa23ce210c4a30a
caf-6a6f.htm,topicNumber=d0e87272 (last visited Mar 23, 2012) (discussing option of rotating 
object to specified or absolute angles). 
 81.  See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. On its website, Meshwerks lists 
several types of CAD software, such as Alias Maya and Inovmetric Polyworks, as a part of its 
tools. See Toolbox, MESHWERKS, http://www.meshwerks.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then 
follow “Toolbox” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
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them.”82  As Part II explains, a proper analysis of “independently 
create” should focus primarily on the subjective process by which the 
copyright holder created the work, or, in other words, what the 
copyright holder actually did—copy or not copy another’s work.83  Part 
II outlines how courts should properly analyze the Meshwerks case.84 
2. Complexities of Digital Creations 
Meshwerks is only the tip of the iceberg.  In the future, courts 
will face even more difficult cases of originality involving digital 
creations.  Although courts must wait for the new digital technologies 
to develop in order to analyze them properly, this Article begins the 
analysis by making educated predictions about some of the features of 
digital technologies that will present problems for originality analysis. 
a. Copying and Customization among the Masses 
One characteristic of digital technologies is that they may offer 
the masses a convenient tool to copy, but also to customize at the same 
time.  The copying feature will diminish one’s chance of satisfying 
originality, while the customization feature will help one’s chance.  
For example, if a person uses a 3D printer to make a toy car that he 
copies from a public domain design, but adds some artistic elements to 
the design, he has an arguable claim of authorship to the new part he 
added.85  As new digital technologies, such as 3D printers, become 
mass produced and marketed to consumers, it is more likely that the 
average person will become a “creator” and implicate copyright with 
their productions at home.  If millions of people eventually own 3D 
printers, the possible claims of authorship by ordinary people will 
reach a level perhaps never experienced before. 
 
 
 
 
 82.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 83.  See infra notes 101-07, 125-26 and accompanying text. 
 84.  See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text. 
 85.  A toy car design might be copyrightable because it is not a useful article (like a real 
car). The design of the toy is “merely to portray the appearance of the article”—meaning an 
actual car—and, therefore, is not considered a useful article. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining 
“useful article”). 
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b. Less Human Input and Artificial Intelligence 
On the flip side, digital technologies may also reduce the level 
of human input needed to create works.  Computer programs can 
generate works on their own, with very little human input.86  
Artificially intelligent programs create works with no human input at 
all.  Imagine, for example, if Siri on the iPhone began creating all of 
the expression in its answers on its own.  Sound fanciful?  
Already-existing artificial intelligence (AI) programs essentially create 
their own works of expression.87  Take, for example, Narrative Science, 
a startup company that has developed a computer program that 
analyzes facts and data, and then creates an article based on the 
information.88  The articles produced are quite impressive—it is 
virtually impossible to tell that a computer program, and not a human 
author, created them.89  Similarly, for nearly forty years, a computer 
program named AARON, developed by Harold Cohen, has been 
creating visual works.90  Obviously, current notions of originality are 
made problematic—if not thrown upside down—to the extent 
computers take over the creative process and begin creating on their 
own.  With the development of AI, courts will face fundamental 
questions of whether nonhumans can be “Authors” under the 
Copyright Clause.91 
c. Dynamic, Fluid, and Complex Relationships 
Another feature of digital creations that may give courts 
problems is the dynamic nature of some creations.  Creations may 
become more fluid and changeable over time.92  Consider, for example, 
 
 86.  See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
 88.  See Rachel Arndt, This Article Was Not Written by a Computer, FAST COMPANY, 
http://www.fastcoexist.com/1678779/this-article-was-not-written-by-a-computer (last visited Apr. 
2, 2012); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-
gaining-traction.html. 
 89.  See, e.g., Final: Wisconsin 51, UNLV 17, BIG TEN NETWORK (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://btn.com/2011/09/01/first-quarter-wisconsin-20-unlv-0; see also Lohr, supra note 88 (noting 
previous Big Ten Network article was written by Narrative Science artificial intelligence). 
 90.  See Harold Cohen, The Further Exploits of AARON, Painter, 4 STAN. HUMAN. REV. 
141 (1995), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/cohen.html. 
 91.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 92.  See, e.g., Roberta R. Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process 
Theology for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889 (2012) (disagreeing 
with the Seventh Circuit’s decision that a living garden is not capable of copyright protection and 
introducing a new way to analyze fluid works under copyright law); see also Kelley v. Chi. Park 
Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (no copyright in “Wildflower Works” landscape art 
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the new, state-of-the-art “light field” cameras.93  The “focusing” of the 
picture occurs after it is shot.94  Any viewer of the photograph can 
“refocus” the photo by pressing the photo on the computer screen.95  
The person who took the photo does not control the focusing.  Instead, 
the viewer does.  Updates to the software for the camera may add 
different features to the photos already taken, such as making them 
viewable in 3D or full focus.96  In the above scenario, does the viewer 
have any claim of authorship by selecting the actual focus of the 
photograph?  What about the software developer who provided, at a 
later time, enhanced features to view the photograph?  If so, are the 
photographer, viewer, and software developer all joint authors?  These 
are perplexing questions that will require a much deeper 
understanding of the concept of originality. 
II. PROPOSAL: DIGITAL ORIGINALITY 
This Part proposes a more fully articulated test of originality 
for cases involving digital creations.  The concept of “digital 
originality” encapsulates this test.  Whether the test should apply 
universally to all creations under copyright law is left for future 
analysis. 
A. Moving to a Three-Part Test of Originality 
Under the conventional account of Feist, courts determine 
originality by a two-part test: the work in question must be 
(1) independently created, and (2) possess at least a modicum of 
creativity.97  Although this two-part test has worked well  
 
because “a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation normally required to 
support copyright”). 
 93.  See Harry McCracken, Lytro: What Really Makes It Revolutionary, CNET NEWS 
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-33200_3-20123224-290/lytro-what-really-makes-it-
revolutionary. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Robert Scoble, My First Photowalk with Lytro’s Lightfield Camera, SCOBLEIZER 
(Dec. 28, 2011), http://scobleizer.com/2011/12/28/lytro_first_use (video discussion at 9:58 minutes 
and following).  
 97.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To be original, an 
element must both be an independent creation of its author and involve at least minimal 
creativity.”); NYMEX, Inc. v. IntercontintentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 113-14 & n.4 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (“Originality is a constitutional requisite and requires that the ‘work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.’” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 345)); see also 2 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:31 (2012) (discussing two requirements of 
independent creation and creativity); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 24, at 1507; Subotnik, 
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enough—even without full explication—in the twenty years following 
Feist, it will face greater strain with the growth of digital creations 
that raise more confounding questions of originality.  Because the 
two-part test conflates several different concerns, it is likely to create 
confusion among the courts as they face more difficult cases.  
Accordingly, to deal with these difficult cases, the courts need to have 
a better understanding of originality and its constituent parts. 
To that end, this Article proposes that originality is better 
understood as a three-part test: the work must be (1) independently 
(2) created, and (3) possess at least a modicum of creativity.  Under 
this framework, each part of the test does slightly different work, as 
summarized in the chart (Figure 2) below and discussed afterwards.  
Courts should use the three-part test in cases involving digital 
creations that raise issues of first impression or more complex issues 
of law than previously faced.98 
 
Figure 2.  The Three-Part Test of Originality 
Independently Create Modicum of 
Creativity 
Process Process + product Product 
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some “creative 
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- but not so mechanical 
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expected as a matter of 
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- Bleistein proviso 
 
= objective 
 2. format: a “work” 
 
 
 
 
= objective 
1. Independently: Not Copied from Other Works 
The first part of the reconfigured test of originality requires 
that a work be independently made by the author “as opposed to 
copied from other works.”99  Under the conventional account of 
originality, courts discuss this component as the requirement of 
“independently create,” or independent creation.100  The grammatical 
 
supra note 27, at 1490. The Tenth Circuit applied this standard two-part formulation of Feist in 
Meshwerks. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 98.  As explained in Part III, whether the test should apply to all cases under copyright 
law is left for future inquiry. For now, the test is limited to those difficult cases involving digital 
creations that raise a novel or more complex question of law. 
 99.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 100.  Id. 
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usage of the adverb “independence” would suggest that consideration 
of both “independently” and “create” together makes logical sense.  
However, the pairing of the two concepts has obscured the meaning 
each respectively contributes to the notion of independent creation.  
To emphasize those individual contributions, this Article proposes 
bifurcating the two terms. 
The “independent” requirement means that, as the Supreme 
Court explained in Feist, one cannot simply copy another person’s 
work if one hopes to qualify for a copyright.101  A mere copy of someone 
else’s work is entirely dependent on the original work for its content.  
For example, if one prints a copy of Shakespeare’s plays from the 
Internet, she has not “independently” made the content in the plays.  
Shakespeare did. 
This notion of “independent” work is similar to trade secret 
law’s concept of independent discovery of a trade secret.  An 
independent discovery of a trade secret, which is categorically 
permissible without the permission of the trade secret owner, means 
the third party did not copy the trade secret.102  Instead, the third 
party discovered the know-how on her own.  Thus, in both copyright 
and trade secret law, copying is the antithesis of independently 
making.103 
Contrary to the analysis in Meshwerks,104 the independence 
requirement focuses on the process of what the person in fact did 
instead of the end product.105  This part of the test is subjective in 
order to highlight that the process of how the creator came up with the 
work is key.  Comparing the work with a similar work—indeed, even 
exactly the same work—cannot answer whether the work in question 
was independently made.  Although exactly identical works might 
suggest copying has occurred, Judge Learned Hand’s famous example 
of two poets independently creating the same poem, cited favorably by 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) (“While trade secret 
law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent 
creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of the 
invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time.” (emphasis added)). 
 103.  Of course, authors routinely “stand on the shoulders” of those who come before; the 
ideal of the romantic author who creates in isolation is largely a myth. See Madhavi Sunder, 
Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 275, 285-92 (2011) (discussing Disney films 
based on earlier works). 
 104.  See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (making an “objective assessment of the particular models before us”). 
 105.  A somewhat analogous approach is used by courts to determine whether artistic 
elements are separable from useful articles. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 
834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting “design process” test and examining “whether 
the aesthetic design elements [we]re significantly influenced by functional considerations”). 
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the Supreme Court in Feist, underscores the subjective nature of the 
independence requirement.106  As long as the two poets are ignorant of 
each other’s works, both of their identical creations are independently 
made.107 
One way of thinking about the independence requirement is as 
a surrogate for copyright infringement.  If one merely copies another’s 
work, the copier is not entitled to a copyright.  Instead, the copier is an 
infringer.108  Conversely, if one independently creates the same work 
as someone else’s, the independent creator has a defense to 
infringement.109  This distinction helps to explain why the two poets 
who create identical works both get copyrights for their works, while 
the copier who makes the same identical work does not. 
Also important to recall is that the independence requirement 
does not prohibit all copying.  It prohibits only copying “from other 
works”110—i.e., what would constitute copyright infringement.111  
Copying other works involved in infringement is different from 
“copying” to depict realistically certain uncopyrightable things in the 
world.  For example, an art student who realistically draws a 
mountain, machine, or motorcycle has independently made the 
drawing, even though the artist strives to depict the mountain, 
machine, or motorcycle in a way that is identical to the real thing.  
The realistic depiction does not involve copying for the purposes of the 
originality requirement of independence.  As Justice Holmes explained 
in his famous opinion in Bleistein: 
It is obvious also that the plaintiff’s case is not affected by the fact, if it be one, that the 
pictures represent actual groups,—visible things. . . .  But even if they had been drawn 
from the life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite proposition 
would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or Whistler was common property because 
others might try their hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original. They 
are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon 
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even 
in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is 
one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the 
words of the act.112 
 
 106.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (citing Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 361. 
 109.  See PATRY, supra note 97, § 3:30 (discussing “defensive” independent creation). 
 110.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 111.  Copying from a work in the public domain (meaning not protected by copyright) 
raises a special problem that is discussed in the context of 3D printing. See infra notes 166-71 
and accompanying text. 
 112.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
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In other words, according to Holmes, people are free to depict 
realistically, or “copy,” “the original” object (e.g., a face) in the world.  
But people are not free to “copy the copy”; they cannot copy someone 
else’s copyrighted work depicting the same object.  This principle 
explains why it is unlawful to sell copies of another’s copyrighted map, 
but perfectly lawful to make a map independently with the exact same 
facts.113  Indeed, even the photography case on which the Meshwerks 
court relied (Skyy I) recognized this basic distinction between copying 
a work and depicting an uncopyrightable item.114 
The wisdom of Justice Holmes’s admonition in Bleistein is 
widely recognized today.  As Judge Posner explained: 
If a painter paints from life, no court is going to hold that his painting is not 
copyrightable because it is an exact photographic likeness.  If that were the rule 
photographs could not be copyrighted—the photographs of Judy Garland in ‘The Wizard 
of Oz,’ for example—but of course they can be.115 
Recent studies of realistic art depictions substantiate the 
soundness of this approach and Justice Holmes’s dictum.116  Being 
able to draw or depict an object in realistic fashion requires artistic 
skill that an artist can develop, but the process of depiction is, in 
itself, highly subjective to the artist.  In one study, neuroscientist R.C. 
Miall and filmmaker John Tchalenko examined the eye and hand 
movements of trained and untrained artists sketching a face.117  Using 
an “eyetracker” device, the study showed a marked difference in the 
eye movements between trained and untrained artists.118  The trained 
artist focused steadily for a longer period on the model’s face while 
drawing but, in between drawing, the artist “would look at his 
drawing with shorter, more rapid fixations or, alternatively, with 
smooth movements that followed the pencil tip across the paper.”119  
By contrast, the untrained artist “did not show clear changes in eye 
 
 113.  See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 149 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
 114.  See Skyy I, 225 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because Ets–Hokin’s product shots 
are shots of the bottle as a whole—a useful article not subject to copyright protection—and not 
shots merely, or even mainly, of its label, we hold that the bottle does not qualify as a 
‘preexisting work’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act. As such, the photos Ets–Hokin took 
of the bottle cannot be derivative works.”); see also Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 
1234-35 (11th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that a photograph of customized motorcycles would not 
create a derivative work because “Latimer’s photographs can best be described as being ‘based 
upon’ the ZX-14 motorcycles, useful articles not subject to copyright protection”). 
 115.  Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 116.  See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text; see infra notes 117-24 and 
accompanying text. 
 117.  See R.C. Miall & John Tchalenko, A Painter’s Eye Movements: A Study of Eye and 
Hand Movement During Portrait Drawing, 34 LEONARDO 35, 35 (2001). 
 118.  Id. at 38. 
 119.  Id. 
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movement when drawing,”120 and his gaze on the face was less focused 
and shorter in duration.121  Similarly, using sensors attached to the 
artist’s hand and pencil, the study found that the trained artist 
displayed a more stable, targeted, and even movement than the 
haphazard movements of the untrained artist.122  Besides these 
physiological differences among portrait sketch artists of different 
abilities, the study also revealed the trained artist’s belief that his 
own drawing was highly subjective: “I’m sure of what I am seeing, I’m 
not quite sure what I am going to do about it.  So I make a decision.  
The final result is made up of a great many decisions.”123  Even more: 
“I try to achieve a likeness.  But what I want is a likeness to the 
reaction I have to something I can see.”124  As the study demonstrates, 
realistic depictions require skill, individual choices, and the personal 
reaction and experience of the creator.  These attributes reflect an 
independent act of creation with a wide degree of subjective choices by 
the artist, not rote copying. 
2. Create a “Work”: Intellectual Production within Subject Matter of 
Copyright 
The second part of the originality test is an act of creating a 
work that falls within copyrightable subject matter.  The “create” 
requirement focuses first on the actual process by which the creator 
made the work in question; at this stage, the requirement is 
subjective.  The “create” requirement also looks at the end product—or 
“work”—but only for the limited purpose of determining whether the 
work falls within the realm of copyrightable subject matter, and not 
some other discipline, such as patents, trademarks, or trade secrets.125  
 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 39. 
 124.  Id. (emphasis added). A study of digital imaging technology used to create printed 
textile designs found a similar opportunity for the technology to facilitate the creative process. 
See Cathy Treadaway, Digital Creativity: The Impact of Digital Imaging Technology on the 
Creative Practice of Printed Textile and Surface Pattern Design, 4 J. TEXTILE & APPAREL, TECH. 
& MGMT. 1 (2004). The level of creativity derived from the digital imaging depends in part “on 
the intrinsic motivation of the practitioner and [her] psychological attitude to it.” Id. at 8.  
 125.  The analogy to draw is to patentable subject matter. Some things such as laws of 
nature, natural phenomenon, and products of nature are not patentable subject matter. See 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). However, even patentable 
subject matter such as an invention may not qualify for a patent if it does not satisfy novelty and 
nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. 
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The “work” inquiry is objective and focuses on the end product of 
whatever act of creation is involved.126 
In this context, “to create” ties back to the constitutional notion 
of being an “Author” of a “Writing” under the Copyright Clause.127  A 
person who “creates” is one who has engaged in acts of authorship 
resulting in a “Writing,” or at least something that falls within the 
subject matter of copyright.  As the Supreme Court has explained, an 
author is “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker,”128 
and authorship involves “intellectual production, . . . thought, and 
conception.”129  The result of authorship should be a “Writing,” broadly 
defined.  Writings “are founded in the creative powers of the mind,” 
and are “the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, 
prints, engravings, and the like.”130 
“To create” a “work” thus adds a different element than the 
independence (do not copy) requirement.  A person can satisfy the 
independence requirement, but fail the “to create” requirement.  For 
example, an independent discovery of the know-how related to a trade 
secret, such as an innovative formula for a mechanical process, would 
satisfy the “independently” requirement, but not the “create” 
requirement.  Creating know-how or a practical invention is not the 
same as creating in the authorial sense.  The creation must involve 
something that falls within the subject matter of copyright (“embodied 
in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like”).131  Likewise, 
one could independently discover a fact or law of nature—satisfying 
the independence requirement of originality—but still fail the second 
requirement of creation of a work.  As the Court recognized in Feist, a 
 
 126.  The “work” factor might also be included in the third part of test (i.e., modicum of 
creativity) or as a part all by itself. However, this Article chooses not to include it in the third 
part of the test, even though it shares some similarity to the objective inquiry under the third 
part. The “modicum of creativity” analysis has its own developed case law. Combining the “work” 
analysis with the third part might create unnecessary confusion with existing case law. Such a 
concern is diminished with the second part (“create”), which has been discussed less in the cases. 
For simplicity, this Article rejects a four-part test. 
 127.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
346-47 (1991). 
 128.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 58 (1884)). 
 129.  Id. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60). 
 130.  Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). 
 131.  Id. (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94). Likewise, as Feist teaches, 
independently compiling a database of facts does not necessarily involve creating a copyrightable 
work. Id. A compiler can become an author by selecting and/or arranging the facts in a way that 
is ultimately deemed to be sufficiently creative. Id. at 349. It goes beyond the scope of this Article 
to discuss nontraditional types of creations that may present difficult questions of copyrightable 
subject matter.  
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discovery of a fact is not an act of creation by an author.132  Nor is the 
creation of a word trademark, such as “Groupon,” no matter how 
clever it is.133 
Although one might consider the ultimate copyrightability of a 
work under this prong, the better approach is to save that inquiry for 
the third part of the test.  Otherwise, the “create” requirement would 
become redundant of the requirement of a modicum of creativity—a 
proposition in no way embraced by Feist.  Thus, so long as a creator 
exercises some “intellectual production, . . . thought, [or] conception” to 
make something in a format that falls within the subject matter of 
copyright, the second requirement is met.134  For example, in Feist, 
Rural Telephone Service satisfied the first two requirements because 
it (1) independently (2) created a white pages phone directory, which 
is a type of work within the subject matter of copyright.135  Rural, 
however, failed the third requirement of making a work that had 
sufficient creativity,136 as explained in the next section. 
3. Modicum of Creativity 
The third requirement—that the work possesses at least a 
modicum of creativity—is an objective test that focuses not on the 
process of creation, but on the end product created.  In order to 
determine whether this third requirement is met, one must examine 
the putative work to see if it has some “creative spark, ‘no matter how 
crude, humble, or obvious.’”137  As the Feist Court explained, “the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice.”138  Thus, “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily.”139 
However, “[t]here remains a narrow category of works in which 
the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
 
 132.  Id. at 347 (“This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. . . . 
[O]ne who discovers a fact is not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’” (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58)). 
 133.  See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2012) (short phrases are not copyrightable). 
 134.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60). 
 135.  Id. at 342; see id. at 358 (“Originality requires only that the author make the 
selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from 
another work), and that it display some minimal level of creativity.”); id. at 363 (“This 
arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that Rural 
undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself.”). 
 136.  Id. at 359. 
 137.  Id. at 345 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990)).  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id.  
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nonexistent.”140  For example, compilations that are “so mechanical or 
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever” fail the creativity 
requirement.141  In Feist, an alphabetical listing of phone numbers 
failed the test because “[i]t is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in 
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a 
matter of course.”142 
Though the Court’s explanation provides some guidance, the 
Court stopped short of defining creativity or what constitutes a 
“creative spark.”  Feist’s analysis provides some clues as to what 
works lack the “creative spark”: (1) works that are “so commonplace 
that it has come to be expected as a matter of course” and (2) works 
that are “so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity 
whatsoever.”143  Only a few courts have found works that flunked this 
low threshold.144 
The Court set a standard that helps courts avoid making 
difficult aesthetic judgments in the first place.  Most works satisfy 
originality; courts need not engage in searching review for originality.  
In drawing the line between the vast majority of works that easily 
satisfy creativity and the narrow class of works that do not, the Court 
favorably cited Justice Holmes’s “aesthetic nondiscrimination” 
principle—depicted above in Figure 2 as the Bleistein proviso—that 
instructs judges to avoid evaluating the artistic merit of works except 
for “the narrowest and most obvious limits.”145  If courts apply this 
generous approach to the originality analysis, probing questions on 
the level of creativity involved in a work are avoided unless the work 
is of doubtful creativity. 
B. Application of Three-Part Test 
This Section applies the reconfigured three-part of originality 
to some digital controversies in order to demonstrate how the test 
sharpens the analysis.  The analysis below shows that the more 
automated digital creations are, the more problems raised under the 
 
 140.  Id. at 359. 
 141.  Id. at 362. 
 142.  Id. at 363. 
 143.  Id. at 362-63. 
 144.  These have occurred mainly in photography cases. For example, lower courts have 
held that slavish photographic copies of works in the public domain lack sufficient creativity. See 
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also 
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 145.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 359 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251 (1903)); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1994) (citing 
Bleistein and discussing test for determining parody is “whether a parodic character may 
reasonably be perceived”). 
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first and second parts of the test.  Digital creations are likely to pass 
easily the test of embodying a minimal degree of creativity, but they 
may face stumbling blocks in “independently” “creating a work.” 
1. Revisiting Meshwerks 
Under the reconfigured test of originality, the outcome of 
Meshwerks would be different.  In short, the digital wire frames 
created by Meshwerks depicting a Toyota car in 3D fashion had 
sufficient originality because they were (1) not copied from other 
works, (2) but, instead, were the result of Meshwerks’s intellectual 
production and were embodied in a work that (3) had at least a 
modicum of creativity.  Although Meshwerks should receive only a 
thin copyright for its particular rendition protecting against only 
slavish copying of Meshwerks’s depiction (others may draw their own 
renditions of the Toyota car, which itself is not copyrightable), 
Meshwerks’s wire-frame depiction had sufficient originality. 
a. Independently 
The first question is whether Meshwerks made something 
independently as opposed to copying it from other works.  The Tenth 
Circuit held that Meshwerks’s wire-frame depictions of the car were 
not independent creations, but instead, were “(very good) copies of 
Toyota’s vehicles.”146  The court based this reasoning on the mistaken 
premise that realistic depictions of things in the world are somehow 
impermissible “copies” under Feist.147  But, as Justice Holmes 
admonished, one can always “copy” what exists in real life and still 
receive copyright protection; one simply cannot copy someone else’s 
copy (meaning someone else’s work).148  What the Tenth Circuit failed 
to apprehend is that Toyota’s vehicles, as useful articles, are not 
copyrightable works.149  An author can freely depict a Toyota car just 
as he can depict Mt. Kilimanjaro or a motorcycle.  All three are 
uncopyrightable subject matter.  A person who sketches the car, 
mountain, or motorcycle easily satisfies the requirement of 
independence.150 
 
 146.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 147.  See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 
 148.  Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; see also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 
(7th Cir. 1983) (discussing importance of Bleistein approach). 
 149.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 150.  To the extent that some of Toyota’s car designs were protected by design patents, 
Toyota authorized Meshwerks to make the digital models of the cars, so Toyota probably had no 
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b. Create a Work 
The next question is whether Meshwerks exercised intellectual 
production, thought, or conception to create something in a format 
within the subject matter of copyright.  This requirement is also met.  
First, the digital wire-frame depictions of the Toyota car undoubtedly 
fall within the subject matter of copyright as pictorial or graphic 
works.151  The only question, then, is whether individuals at 
Meshwerks exercised enough human thought in the process of 
creation for the law to consider them to be the originators or creators 
of the content. 
Had a computer program created entirely the wire frames of 
the Toyota car, the models arguably would not meet the second 
requirement of originality.152  However, in this case, Meshwerks 
employees spent eighty to one hundred hours per car manually 
fine-tuning, correcting, and adding further details (including door 
handles, headlights, and wheels) to the initial computer-generated 
model to “sculpt” the model into something more realistic—a 
two-dimensional graphic that looked three-dimensional.153  Even the 
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that Meshwerks exercised significant 
human thought in creating the wire-frame model of the Toyota car: 
“we do not for a moment seek to downplay the considerable amount of 
time, effort, and skill that went into making Meshwerks’ digital wire-
frame models.”154  If simply pressing a button to snap a photograph is 
a sufficient act of authorship or creation,155 then it is hard to imagine 
that spending over eighty hours digitally modeling a realistic 
wire-frame depiction of a car—an exercise of skill probably few, 
untrained lay people could demonstrate—is not a sufficient act of 
authorship or creation.  The key is not the time or labor involved, but 
rather the artistic thought required to conceptualize and depict 
something two dimensional to appear three dimensional—and in 
realistic fashion.156 
 
claim that Meshwerks infringed Toyota’s design patents. See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266 
(discussing Toyota’s design patents). 
 151.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works). 
 152.  Cf. Lucky Break Wishbone Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 373 F. App’x 752, 754-55 
(9th Cir. 2010) (finding originality in 3D plastic wishbone based on scanned dimensions of actual 
wishbone and other additions made by human input). 
 153.  Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260-61. 
 154.  Id. at 1268.  
 155.  See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 148 
(7th Cir. 1985) (“A photograph may be copyrighted, although it is the work of an instant and its 
significance may be accidental.”). 
 156.  See supra notes 68-81, 111-24 and accompanying text. 
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c. Modicum of Creativity 
The final question is whether the digital wire-frame models of 
the Toyota car have a minimal level of creativity.  The Tenth Circuit 
did not make a judgment on this factor, but parts of its opinion 
suggest that the court doubted this factor was met.157  Analogizing a 
digital wire frame to a photograph, the court reasoned that the 
“unadorned” Toyota wire frame must be “filtered out” of the originality 
analysis just as a bottle in a photograph of the bottle supposedly 
would: 
And, by analogy . . . we hold that the unadorned images of Toyota’s vehicles cannot be 
copyrighted by Meshwerks and likewise must be filtered out.  To the extent that 
Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models depict only those unadorned vehicles, having 
stripped away all lighting, angle, perspective, and “other ingredients” associated with an 
original expression, we conclude that they have left no copyrightable matter.158 
The Tenth Circuit’s “filtering” out of the unadorned Toyota car 
from the creativity analysis was erroneous.  First of all, the Skyy cases 
on which the Tenth Circuit relied did not undertake any such 
“filtering” analysis for determining the threshold question of 
originality.  Instead, to the extent any filtering of unprotected 
elements occurred, it occurred in the infringement analysis only after 
applying a liberal test of originality to find that the photograph met 
the test.159 
More fundamentally, unlike a photograph of a bottle, 
Meshwerks’s digital wire-frame model of the car does not depict an 
actual wire-frame car that exists in real life—Toyota’s cars do not 
have wire frames in their construction or assembly.  In this sense, 
Meshwerks’s wire-frame car depiction is a fictitious or imagined 
representation of the car.160  The three-dimensional wire frames are, 
in other words, fictitious incremental additions by Meshwerks to the 
Toyota car design.  Such imagined representations—which exist 
nowhere in the actual car and which Meshwerks sculpted manually on 
the computer—should easily pass the test of creativity. 
Granted, some imaginary representations of objects in the 
world may be too crude to pass the low threshold.  A simple stick 
 
 157.  See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265. 
 158.  Id. at 1266. 
 159.  See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. (Skyy II), 323 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Skyy I, 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 160.  See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1517. The Meshwerks court’s emphasis on the 
“unadorned” nature of the wire-frame digital model of the car masked the creativity involved in 
depicting wire frames that do not exist in the actual car. See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265. For 
example, imagine someone created a 3D wire frame of a nude human body. Even though the wire 
frame of the human body was “unadorned,” arguably the rendering of the 3D wire frame of the 
nude human body would possess some “creative spark.” 
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figure of a human being might be so crude or common to fail the low 
threshold of creativity.161  However, nowhere in the opinion did the 
Tenth Circuit suggest the wire-frame models were like stick figures.  
Meshwerks’s model of the car (shown above in Figure 1) had 
considerable detail to make the realistic appearance of 
three-dimensional shape, contours, and depth of the car on a 
two-dimensional screen.  Meshwerks chose to position the wire-frame 
car against no background, at different angles to which the car can be 
rotated, with wire frames transversing the car’s contours, plus black 
or gray lines, making the car, in effect, see-through in places.  These 
detailed features, parts of which are purely imaginary, show some 
“creative spark, no matter how crude.”162  That the parties intended to 
have Meshwerks create a digital car model that could serve as the 
basis for Toyota to modify and use in commercial advertisements does 
not disqualify Meshwerks’s digital depiction of its creativity.163 
Finally, as discussed above, the court based its analysis on the 
false premise that the elements of photography that make photos 
original—such as lighting and staging—are the same for digital 
modeling.  They are not.  Digital modeling in realistic fashion may 
involve far more human input than snapping a photo.  Moreover, the 
photograph cases the court relied on—Skyy I and II—reaffirmed the 
approach of the majority of courts that “no photograph, however 
simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author”164 
and, therefore, “almost any[ ] photograph may claim the necessary 
originality to support a copyright merely by virtue of the 
photographers’ [sic] personal choice of subject matter, angle of 
photograph, lighting, and determination of the precise time when the 
photograph is to be taken.”165  Under the prevailing approach to 
photography, Meshwerks’s model should easily pass the test of 
creativity. 
 
 161.  See Dean D. Niro, Protecting Characters Through Copyright Law: Paving a New 
Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic, and Motion Picture Characters Can All Travel, 41 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 359, 374-75 (1992).  
 162.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990)). 
 163.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (concluding 
circus pictures used for commercial advertisements were not disqualified from copyright); James 
Elkins, Art History and the Criticism of Computer-Generated Images, 27 LEONARDO 335, 336 
(1994) (“[I]f we look away on account of the unpleasant glare of technological references, we risk 
missing the development of new meanings—and most importantly, we tend to assume that the 
technology is contributing something superficial—such as efficiency—when it may also be 
bending artistic purposes in new directions.”). 
 164.  See Skyy I, 225 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone 
Publ’g Co. 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). 
 165.  See id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
2.08(E)(1) (1990)). 
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2. 3D Printers 
The proposed test of originality will better enable courts to 
evaluate the potential originality of creations by new technologies, 
such as 3D printers.  Some creations from 3D printers will have no 
trouble passing the test of originality, while others may face 
difficulties. 
a. Independently 
Creations produced by 3D printers can satisfy the 
independence requirement if the designs of the objects utilized by 3D 
printers are not copied from someone else’s work.  For example, if a 
person created a computer-aided design (CAD) of a toy train from 
scratch, and not copied from elsewhere, the design would satisfy the 
independence requirement.  Both the computer design (a pictorial 
work) and the 3D toy train produced (a sculptural work) receive 
copyright protection, provided that they satisfy the other two 
requirements of originality.  On the other hand, if a person simply 
downloaded someone else’s CAD of the toy train from the Internet, the 
copied design and 3D toy train produced would flunk the 
independence requirement.  The person would not have independently 
created the CAD and toy; instead, he merely copied the designs. 
A more difficult question arises if the design of the work or 
CAD is in the public domain (meaning not protected by copyright166), 
but still allows some user customization of the object printed, such as 
color, shape, and size.  Imagine that the CAD software allows the user 
to manipulate a public domain CAD for a toy train by selecting 
different colors, shapes, and sizes for the train.  What if the user 
picked the color and size for the train, but the software did everything 
else?  Would that be enough of an incremental addition to the public 
domain CAD for the addition to be “independent,” and not just copied? 
These additions are probably not enough to satisfy the 
independence requirement.  Copyright law allows people to copyright 
their incremental additions to public domain works if those additions 
satisfy originality.  Courts have required “more than merely [a] 
trivial” variation from the public domain work.167  Otherwise, the 
subsequent work is nothing more than a copy of the public domain 
work, which is free for all to copy.168  For example, in the famous case 
 
 166.  See generally Brown v. Latin Am. Music Co., 498 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(describing public domain). 
 167.  See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 168.  See id. at 452 n.5 (“We emphasize that compilations or new arrangements of 
material which represent merely trivial additions to or omissions from a preexisting map will not 
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Batlin, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a 
new plastic version of the classic Uncle Sam bank, already in the 
public domain, lacked originality because the plastic bank was 
“‘extremely similar to the cast iron bank, save in size and material’ 
with the only other differences, such as the shape of the satchel and 
the leaves in the eagle’s talons being ‘by all appearances, minor.’”169  
Accordingly, the plastic bank was “practically an exact copy” of the 
Uncle Sam bank in the public domain.170 
The hypothetical toy train based on a public domain CAD 
would face similar problems.  Copyright law would likely consider 
changes to the color and size to be merely trivial variations from the 
public domain design and, therefore would consider the resulting toy 
trains to be mere copies of the public domain design.171  If the user of 
the CAD software made greater changes to the public domain train, 
such as adding new features or styling to the body of the train, the 
user would have a better chance of satisfying the independence 
requirement. 
b. Create a Work 
Creating one’s own CAD of a toy train from scratch would 
easily satisfy the “create” requirement.  Creating the design from 
scratch manifests intellectual conception, thought, and  
production—all “founded in the creative powers of the mind.”172  The 
toy train is a type of work that falls within the subject matter of 
copyright.  By contrast, if a user simply downloaded someone else’s 
CAD of the toy train and pressed “print” on the 3D printer, she would 
not satisfy the second requirement.  The toy train did not originate 
from the user’s mental creation.  Likewise, in the cases involving 
public domain CADs that allow customization, a user may have a 
harder time satisfying the second requirement if the choices of 
customization—such as color, size, and shape—are modest, resulting 
 
support a copyright absent some additional original work. For example, copying the outline of 
the United States and the boundaries of each state cannot be said to involve any element of 
original choice or arrangement.” (citation omitted)). 
 169.  L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Cf. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Additions to the preexisting 
maps such as color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and shapes fall within the narrow 
category of works that lack even a minimum level of creativity . . . .”); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2006) 
(discussing Copyright Office approach to coloring). But cf. Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 
159 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing use of various colors in map as a part of overall 
creative arrangement). 
 172.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). 
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in only trivial variations from the public domain designs.  Thus, in 
many cases, the first two requirements—independent and create—will 
likely track each other. 
However, in some cases, the putative work may satisfy the 
independence requirement, but fail the “create” requirement.  For 
example, the objects printed by the 3D printer may be useful 
articles—such as a can opener or hammer—that do not fall within the 
subject matter of copyright.  Even though the objects may be 
independently produced and not copied, they fail the “create” 
requirement of embodying a format that falls within copyrightable 
subject matter. 
c. Modicum of Creativity 
For many works created on a 3D printer, the third requirement 
will be easy to satisfy.  The court must examine the object produced by 
the 3D printer to see if it has the “creative spark” and is not so 
mechanical “to be expected as a matter of course.”173  Moreover, under 
the Bleistein proviso, courts are to avoid judging the artistic worth of 
various works “outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”174 
Under this lenient approach, a CAD of a toy train made from 
scratch, even if “crude, humble, or obvious,” would likely satisfy the 
minimal level of creativity.  However, if a user simply downloaded 
someone else’s CAD of a toy train and pressed “print” on the 3D 
printer, there is no creativity on the part of the user.  The user has 
added nothing to the CAD.175  Likewise, if a user copied a public 
domain CAD of a toy train and changed only the color, size, and shape, 
the user’s additions may face a difficult time satisfying even the low 
threshold of creativity. 
3. Siri on iPhone 
Siri on the iPhone presents even more perplexing questions for 
originality.  The three-part test of originality illuminates the key 
issues.  As explained below, one of the most perplexing issues will 
arise if Siri itself creates answers on its own through artificial 
intelligence: To what extent are Siri’s answers the original expression 
of an author? 
 
 173.  Id. at 363. 
 174.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 175.  As shown by this example, the parts of the originality test sometimes overlap. By 
definition, a mere copy cannot be the result of the copier’s independent creation, or possess a 
modicum of creativity added by the copier. However, each part of the test has a slightly different 
function that surfaces, especially in more difficult cases. 
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a. Independently 
Whether Siri satisfies the first requirement of independence 
will depend on the source for Siri’s answers.  To the extent Siri’s 
answers are not copied from outside sources, the answers will meet 
the independence requirement. 
Imagine that Siri provides the following answers, at different 
times, to the question, “What is the meaning of life?” 
(1) “Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get 
some walking in, and try to live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds 
and nations.” (created by Siri programmer); 
(2) “42.” (quoted from other source by Siri programmer); and 
(3) “I don’t know. But I think there’s an app for that.” (created by artificial 
intelligence).176 
For the purposes of this discussion, imagine that the first 
answer was created by a Siri programmer and programmed into the 
software for Siri’s response, the second answer was a quote from the 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy programmed into Siri’s software, and 
third answer was created by the artificial intelligence of Siri itself. 
In terms of the independence requirement, the second answer 
presents the easiest scenario.  Because the answer is simply a 
verbatim quote, it was not independently produced.  It therefore fails 
the first part of the originality test.  By contrast, the first and third 
answers were not copied from other sources.  The first was 
independently produced by Siri’s programmer, while the third was 
independently produced by Siri, the artificial intelligence.  Both 
satisfy the independent requirement.  The third answer presents an 
interesting question of “authorship,” which is better addressed under 
the second requirement. 
b. Create a Work 
Whether Siri’s answers satisfy the second requirement will 
again depend on the source of Siri’s answers.  An answer copied from 
an outside source, such as the second answer above, will not satisfy 
the “create” requirement.  But if Siri’s programmers created the 
answers (e.g., the first answer above) or if Siri itself created the 
answers (e.g., the third answer above), these answers may satisfy the 
“create” requirement. 
 
 176.  The answers in the hypothetical are ones that Siri actually provides. However, this 
hypothetical imagines that one of the answers Siri itself created through artificial intelligence 
(instead of being pre-programmed), even though Siri is probably not (yet) sophisticated enough to 
generate answers on its own. 
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Some human conception and production of expression are 
required for a person to write the following answer: “Try and be nice to 
people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get 
some walking in, and try to live together in peace and harmony with 
people of all creeds and nations.”  Such expression—fixed somewhere 
in Siri’s database or memory and also viewable on the iPhone screen 
and narrated in audio—falls within copyrightable subject matter, at 
least as a literary work.177 
The more difficult question is whether Siri’s artificial 
intelligence-generated answer satisfies the “create” requirement.  
Scholars have long debated the problem of authorship presented by AI 
and computer-generated works.178  Some favor allowing copyrights 
and treating the programmer, the AI, and/or the user as the author.179  
Others take the contrary view.180  This Article does not take a final 
position in this ongoing debate over AI generated works.181  For this 
Article’s purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that the second part of 
the originality test raises a fundamental question of whether 
 
 177.  The textual component of Siri’s answer would qualify as a literary work. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in 
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the 
material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or 
cards, in which they are embodied.”).  
 178.  See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: 
Considering the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 
660-73 (2006); Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial 
Intelligence, 4 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 707, 744-46 (1982); Evan H. Farr, Copyrightability of 
Computer-Created Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 63, 79-80 (1989); Karl F. Milde, 
Jr., Can a Computer be An “Author” or an “Inventor”?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378, 401-04 (1969); 
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1036-37 
(1993); Susan H. Nycum & Ivan K. Fong, Artificial Intelligence and Certain Resulting Legal 
Issues, 1985 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 6; Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in 
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986); Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games 
to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly 
Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 173-74 (1997). 
 179.  See, e.g., Butler, supra note 178, at 744-46 (various entities determined by 
imaginary author); Farr, supra note 178, at 79-80 (programmer); Milde, supra note 178, at 
401-04 (AI); Miller, supra note 178, at 1056-57 (possible allocation of copyright among different 
people); Nycum & Fong, supra note 178, at 1, 6 (AI software copyright owner and user); 
Samuelson, supra note 178, at 1192 (user); Wu, supra note 178, at 173-74 (possible allocation 
among programmer, user, and AI if it can be incentivized); Saif M. Khan, Creativity by Artificial 
Intelligence: Who Gets the Copyright? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (possible 
allocation to user, programmer acting as user, and possibly to AI if they can be incentivized or 
pass Turing test). 
 180.  See Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer 
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997). 
 181.  This author’s preliminary view is against recognizing AI created works as original 
works of authorship and leaving those works unprotected by copyright. 
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copyright’s scope should include nonhuman creators that create 
practically all of the expression. 
c. Modicum of Creativity 
Siri’s first and third answers above are creative enough to pass 
the modicum of creativity test.  One might question whether the third 
answer, consisting of only ten words, is long enough to satisfy the 
creativity requirement.182  However, it is more than just a short 
phrase and perhaps the law should consider it within the 
question-and-answer context, which together can constitute a joint 
work.183  Even if evaluating Siri’s answer alone, recent cases have 
recognized that short sentences (even haiku) can be copyrightable.184  
By contrast, the second answer, a mere copied quote, fails the 
creativity test. 
C. Advantages of the Three-Part Test of Originality 
As demonstrated by the previous discussion, reconfiguring the 
test of originality to a three-part test helps to understand better the 
elements required for originality.  Delineating precisely what each 
element requires helps courts avoid confusion over or conflation of the 
various elements of originality, as was evident in the Meshwerks 
case.185  Although the three-part test is not a mathematical formula 
that mechanically determines whether a work is original, the test 
adds greater precision to the analysis.  In difficult cases, such as those 
raised by AI and 3D printing, the three-part test helps to identify the 
proper questions that courts must answer under the respective parts 
of the test. 
 
 182.  Cf. CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519-20 (1st Cir. 
1996) (holding short phrases are not copyrightable). 
 183.  See Andrea S. Hirsch, Comment, Copyrighting Conversations: Applying the 1976 
Copyright Act to Interviews, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 1071, 1081-82 (1982). Whether the Q&A satisfies 
fixation of a work is an interesting question. The Q&A on Siri appears in text and audio form on 
the iPhone 4S at least long enough for the person to read it. That may be enough for fixation 
under current law. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 
1993) (discussing fixation of a copy of a program in temporary RAM). 
 184.  See Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 635 
(8th Cir. 1989) (finding originality in “test statements [that] are short, simple, declarative 
sentences, but they are not merely fragmentary words and phrases within the meaning of 37 
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)”); Stern v. Does, No. CV-09-01986-DMG (PLAx), 2011 WL 997230, at *6 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (“[T]he copyrightability of a very short textual work—be it word, phrase, 
sentence, or stanza—depends on the presence of creativity.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 
95-CV-1107-A,1996 WL 633131, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (suggesting haiku is copyrightable); 
see also Stephanie T. North, Note, Twitteright: Finding Protection in 140 Characters or Less, 11 
J. HIGH TECH. L. 333 (2011) (analyzing possible originality in tweets). 
 185.  Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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III. RESPONDING TO CONCERNS 
This Part addresses concerns to the proposed three-part test of 
digital originality and shows why the test is, on a balance, an 
improvement over the current approach. 
A. Complicating Originality 
Some may object to the proposed test as needlessly 
complicating the doctrine of originality.  Critics may contend that the 
three-part test yields very little additional insight beyond the two-part 
test that already applies and that a special test that applies only to 
digital creations may create unnecessary confusion for courts.  For 
example, should digital photographs now be analyzed under the 
three-part test? 
The criticism of complexity has some validity.  Switching to a 
three-part test does add a measure of complexity to the analysis 
beyond the current two-part test.  Yet the added complexity is justified 
if it yields more reasoned and informed results in complex cases.  
Breaking down the Feist test into three elements emphasizes the 
distinct contributions each part of the test provides to the analysis. 
As Figure 3 depicts below, the different parts of the test 
perform different roles.  In some cases, a work may satisfy the 
independence and creativity requirements, but not the second 
requirement of creating a work (for example, functional know-how or 
useful articles independently created, or, arguably, a work created 
solely by artificial intelligence).  Likewise, in other cases, a work may 
satisfy the independence and “create” requirements, but not the 
modicum of creativity requirement (for example, the white pages 
phone directory in Feist).  As explained above, Meshwerks’s 
wire-frame depictions of the car satisfy each part of the test of 
originality, whereas a mere copy of someone else’s work will fail each 
part.186  Understanding what each part of originality is testing will 
help courts avoid committing the same mistake as the Tenth Circuit 
did in Meshwerks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 186.  See supra notes 146-82 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3. Analysis Under Three-Part Test of Originality 
 Independently Create/Format 
Modicum of 
Creativity 
Creating Coke formula  X  
AI-generated work  X  
White pages phonebook in 
Feist 
  X 
3D wireframes in 
Meshwerks 

 

 

 
Copied work X X X 
 
Moreover, the concern about creating two different tests of 
originality is misplaced.  There is only one test of originality.  Both 
formulations of the test (two-part and three-part) derive directly from 
Feist.187  Many run-of-the-mill copyright cases may not require an 
extended analysis of originality because the works in question easily 
pass the test, however formulated.  The proposed test does not require 
more work for courts or the Copyright Office with respect to these easy 
cases.  Instead, the three-part test provides greater guidance on 
originality especially for those difficult cases or cases of first 
impression presented by new digital technologies. 
B. Backsliding to Photography or Non-Digital Works 
Related to the first concern, some may object to the proposed 
test as possibly raising the bar of originality for works that courts 
have long since deemed sufficient to pass the low threshold.  
Photography is one example—should digital photographs be analyzed 
under the three-part test of digital originality?  And, if so, then under 
the reconfigured test, some photographs taken simply by a person 
pressing a button—with today’s sophisticated automatic cameras 
doing pretty much everything else—may not contain enough 
“intellectual production, . . . thought, [or] conception.”188  In other 
words, the law may view merely pressing a button on a camera as 
akin to pressing a button on a 3D printer.  Neither involves enough 
creative thought for authorship, one might conclude. 
 
 187.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 188.  Id. at 347. 
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Other scholars have debated more extensively whether courts 
should subject photographs to greater scrutiny for originality.189  The 
Supreme Court left the door open to that possibility in 
Burrow-Giles,190 although most lower courts have rejected the 
possibility and applied a very low threshold to photographs.191  It goes 
beyond the scope of this Article to revisit that debate.  On one hand, 
principles of stare decisis may militate in favor of retaining the 
prevailing approach to photographs, as may other prudential reasons 
such as those articulated by Professor Subotnik.192  On the other hand, 
reexamination of the photography case law may be helpful in better 
understanding what purposes originality should serve.  This Article’s 
proposal is compatible with either approach. 
The same response applies to fears that the three-part test may 
eventually creep back to cases involving nondigital works and make it 
more difficult for them to satisfy originality.  The proposal gives courts 
the option to limit the proposed test to new types of digital creations 
that raise issues of first impression.  The proposal provides courts 
guidance to handle these novel issues, rather than requiring courts to 
revisit old cases or well-known types of works. 
C. Defending Meshwerks 
Finally, some may disagree with this Article’s criticism of 
Meshwerks and argue that the Tenth Circuit correctly decided the 
case.  Some may contend that the Toyota car design is copyrightable 
because it “can be identified separately from” the useful article of the 
car itself,193 or that, in any event, copyright law should consider 
realistic depictions of uncopyrightable subject matter “copying” for the 
purposes of originality.  For the reasons explained above, both 
arguments run counter to existing case law.194  But, even assuming 
the possibility for disagreement, such disagreement justifies even 
further the need for reexamining the elements of the Feist test to drill 
 
 189.  See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1528-29. 
 190.  See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (questioning 
whether “ordinary production” of a photograph satisfies originality if “[i]t is simply the manual 
operation, by the use of these instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the 
visible representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this representation being its 
highest merit”). 
 191.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See Subotnik, supra note 27, at 1528-29 (“[H]eightening the originality bar might 
distort artistic production or increase judicial tastemaking . . . ”). 
 193.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work”); see also 
supra note 53. 
 194.  See supra notes 53, 56, 85, 110-15, and accompanying text. 
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down exactly what each element means.  For far too long, these 
elements have remained opaque. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For new types of digital creations, courts should reconfigure 
the test of originality into a three-part test, asking whether the work 
in question (1) was independently produced, (2) in a way that required 
the creative powers of the mind and resulted in a creation that falls 
within the subject matter of copyright, and (3) possesses a modicum of 
creativity.  This test offers a more precise way to analyze whether 
originality exists in digital creations, especially in cases of first 
impression involving new technologies. 
 
